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A TRAGIC VIEW 
OF POVERTY LAW PRACTICE 
Paul R. Tremblay'" 
INTRODUCTION 
Poverty lawyers, we are told, can do as much harm as good for their clients. 
This humbling theme has been a fIxture in the literature and research 
surrounding the role of lawyers for the poor for some time. The theme 
captures several deep truths about poverty law. It reminds us that lawyers for 
the poor can, and do, exclude their clients in the work that they do, view the 
lives of clients through the distorted prism oflaw training and law practice, and 
tend to expend their energies on remedies and processes, largely litigation 
oriented, which are unlikely to lead to meaningful change in the lives of the 
poor. Well-intentioned lawyers for the disadvantaged tend to reproduce with 
their clients the subordination from which clients seek to escape. 
This article attempts to offer a preliminary critique of a vision of practice 
that has emerged in recent years in response to the theme just described. In 
light of the contradictions, paradoxes, and "antinomies" of lawyering for the 
disadvantaged, several writers have begun to craft· a method of practice that 
emphasizes and fosters the goal of empowerment of clients. This emerging 
vision, which I will refer to in this article as the Critical View (while 
acknowledging that the various authors upon whom I draw do not speak with 
one voice), hopes to transform poverty law and render it less paradoxical, and 
less disempowering. It is a valuable, appealing, and instructive vision. In its 
expression of a radical method of interacting with dependent people, it compels 
those who work with the poor to reconsider in fundamental ways the 
assumptions and biases of their practice. 
For this vision to be truly transformative, however, it must offer realistic 
possibilities of altering the day-to-day life and practice of poverty lawyers. 
Critical View adherents would appear to agree with this normative construct 
Their vision takes the form of a IITheory of Practice," with the Practice 
perspective as essential. This article, expressing what I might call the Tragic 
View, questions the likelihood of a true transformation of poverty law practice 
" Assistant Clinical Professor of Law, Boston College of Law. The Iluthor lh:lnlcs MIlrk Spiegel f~ hb 
helpful reactions to an earlier draft of this piece. 
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within the street level bureaucracy characteristic of a typical legal services 
office, where the most significant poverty lawyering occurs. I disagree very 
little with the critique propounded by the Critical View, but I suggest that its 
proposals to restructure this kind of lawyering rest on insufficiently developed 
theories of autonomy, and neglect in important ways the conflicting pressures 
upon the lawyers who encounter the daily struggles of the poor. A 
transformative model of poverty lawyering may indeed be possible along the 
lines suggested by the Critical View, but we ought to remain fairly skeptical 
until we are satisfied tlrat adequate means exists for confronting the individual 
crises that are inevitable in legal services practice. 
This article will proceed as follows. Part I will describe briefly the Critical 
View, first in its critique of traditional poverty law practice and second in its 
proposals for a new vision of the poverty lawyer/poor client interaction. Part 
n will highlight my concerns about the proposed new vision of practice. It 
will offer my Tragic View of this landscape, a view that confronts the informed 
consent and triage considerations which ineluctably limit our hopes for a more 
perfect lawyering world. 
I. THE CiuTICAL VIEW 
A The Critique of Traditional Poverty Law Practice 
The concerns that inspire the Critical View have been with us at least since 
Jean Cahn and Edgar Cahn published their pioneering article on poverty law 
in 1964.1 The Cahns' proposed Hcivilian perspectiveH on the War on Poverty 
was intended as a rebellion against the centralized, comprehensive, and 
professionalized poverty programs that they observed being established under 
President Johnson's noble campaign to eradicate economic inequality. They 
correctly noted that professional poverty programs excluded the voice of clients 
in their structure and design.2 The Cahns suggested that programs for the poor 
"amplifyO not [only] the voices of dissent but the voices of silence."l To 
demonstrate their thesis, the Cahns described in some detail a poverty law 
1. SeeCahn&Cahn, 'Ihe War on Poverty: A Clvl/lan Perspective, 73 YALEW. 1317 (l964)[bereinafter 
War on Poverty]. 
2. Id. at 1332. The -one necessary characteristic· of an effective poverty proaram is that ·It voice the 
concerns of individuals in their capacity as citizens.· 
3. Id. at 1333. 
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practice that might incorporate this civilian perspective. 4 Their practice vision 
was democratic and participatory in spirit,' but its design could not resist the 
divisions between a professional perspective and a community-based 
perspective.1S The Cahns' poverty law finn tends to look rather conservative 
from existing perspectives, with its reliance on conventional lawyering as a 
base on which to develop community power.7 
The Cahns opened the debate about the proper role of professionals in aiding 
the dependent and disadvantaged by calling to our attention the propensity of 
professionals to ignore the perspectives of those whom they seek to help or 
serve. In the 28 years since the Calms wrote their article, the level of discourse 
on this iSsue has grown in sophistication and in breadth of perspective. The 
Critical View that I will describe here is of more recent vintage, and rests 
largely on the recent contributions of Tony Alfieri,S Lucie White,9 and Jerry 
4. Id. at. 1334-52. 
5. The proposed -university affiliated, neighborhood law Cum- WIlS to -stimulate ~d=hip llmong the 
community's present inhabitants.- Id. at 1334. The Cnhns saw the law fum as responsive 10 the ~ of 
the community rnemb=, as empowering those membus in wnys that mighl be more imm:diatcJy effective 
thnn would community organizing, !ll1d as effecting nIl inere:=d -respozciVe!l!:C:l of officWs nod priVllte 
p3rlies to the equitnble denm!ds of the community's membezs.. - Id. at 1346. A them: that pmists in the 
Cnhns's discussion is one of responsiveness to the agendas thaI the community pr=ts. rolher th:In a more 
professionaI-directed ptlIctice. 
6. For instance, the authors struggled with an endemic dilemma of community-b:l.!;ed lawyering, the 
problem of-sacrificing nIl individual client to a 'grenter cauze,'- Id. at 1348, nod recognized the difficultie:l 
presented by allowing the lawyers 10 decide whether 10 tum awny clients wilo::;e = were unpopubr.ld. 
7. Id. The Calms argue that lawyers cnn serve community organizations by offering their tccIuUcal skills 
to aid community members in -implemenling the civilian persp:ctive.- Id. at 1336. I refer 10 their view as 
-conservative- because it accepts fundamentally the benefits offered by the existing legal regime. even as 
it rebels against that regime. ThaI view resembles whal Lucie While has tenn::d -CUSI..<f1m:nsjona1-
lawyering. White, To Learn and Teach: Ussons from Drlefonteln on Lawyerlns and POWtT, 699 WISe. L 
REv. 755 (1988) [hereinafter To Learn and Teach). 
8. Alfieri, The Anlinomies of Poverty Law and a Theory of DIaloslc Empowennl!nl. 16 N.Y.U. &11. L 
&. Soc. Change 659 (1987-88) [hereinafter Antinomies); Alfieri, &construcnve Poverty Law PracJIce: 
Learning Lessons o/Client Narrative, 100 YALE U. 2105 (1991) [hueinnfter &construaiVI! Poverty Law 
Proctice); Alfieri, Spea/dng Out of Tum: The Srory of Josl!phlnl! Y.,4 GED. 1. w. Ennes 619 (1991) 
[hereinafter Speaking OUI o/Tum]. 
9. White, MobllizJuion on the Margins o/the Lawsuil: Ma/dnS Sp<lce for Clienrs 10 Spt!JJk, 16 N.Y.U. 
REv. L &. Soc. CHANGE 535 (1987-88) [hereinafter MobllizJuion on the Margins); White, Subordlr.tlllon, 
Rherorlcal Survival SIdlls, and Sunday Shoes: Nores on the Hearlns of Mn. G., 38 Buffalo L &11. 1 (1990) 
[b.ereinafter Sunday Shoes]; White, Goldberg v. Kelly and the Paradox of Lawyerlns for the Poor, 56 
BRoonYN L REv. 861 (1990) (hereinafter Paradox). See also To Uam and Teach. mpra note. at 7. 
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LOpezlO to this colloquy. Other writers have contributed significantly to the 
development of the critique.ll I choose to focus on these three authors and 
their recent scholarship because they seem to express a most direct exhortation 
for a new vision of the day-to-day practice of lawyering with the 
disadvantaged. Their critique is complex, deep, and intricately developed, and 
I am able only to highlight here two central themes that best capture their 
vision. I can only apologize for my attempt at such simplification. 
The first theme is one which I will call II client voice. II The three authors 
appear to share a largely coincident perspective on this theme, which 
echoes-but also differs from-the Cahns' "civilian perspective.N12 The Critical 
View Hsuggests a practice of lawyering which would continually cede to 
'clients' the power to speak for themselves." l3 In existing poverty lawyering, 
H[v]oices are silenced and stories are forgotten. The voices silenced are the 
voices of clients. The stories forgotten are the stories of client self-
empowerment." 14 Lawyers, according to this view, exclude client voice in 
their endeavor to "re-present" clients. is This exclusion of voice is both literal, 
10. LOpez, Reconcdving Civil Rights Practice: Seven Weeb In the Ufe of a Rebt:lUolLJ Collaborarlon. 
77 GED. U. 1603 (1989) [hereinafter RebeUJOILJ Collabaralion]; LOpez. Training Future lAwyers ro Work 
with the PolilJcaUy and Socially Dlsadvanraged: AIIli-Generic Legal Education. 91 W.VA. 1.. REV. 305 
(1989) [hereinafter Anri-Generic Legal Educarlon]; LOpez, lAy lAwyering. 32 UCLA 1.. REv. 1 (1984). 
11. I cannot do justice in this footnote to the scholanl and practitioners who have !lerved to develop the 
empowerment perspective, but certain significant contributions do warrant note here. and I will nllude to their 
contribution in this article. See. e.g •• Bellow. Turning Soludons Inra Probkm.s: The Legal Aid Experience. 
34 NLADA BRIEl'cAsB 106 (1977); Simon, Visions of Pracdce in Legal Thoughr. 36 STAN. 1.. REv. 469 
(1984) ~reinafIer Yisions of Pracdce]; Gabel & Harris, Building Power and BreaJdng Images: Crirical 
Legal Theory and rhe Pracdce of lAw. 11 N.Y.U. REv. 1.. & SOClAL CHANOB 369 (1982·83); Abel. lAw 
Withour PoUrics: Legal Aid Under Advanced Copirallsm. 32 UCLA 1.. Rev. 474 (1985); Hodgkis3. 
Peddoning and rhe Empowermenr Theory of Pracdce. 96 YALE U. 569 (1987); Snrnt. • •.• Tht lAw 1$ All 
Ovtr·: Power. RuUrance and rhe Legal ConsciolLJlIUS of the Welfare Poor .. 2 Y ALB J.L. & HUM. 343 
(1990); Lesnick, Tht Wellsprings of ugal /le$ponsu ro Inequalily: A Ptl'$pecrivt on Pel'$pecrives. 1991 
Dukt U. 413. 
12. The Cahns were directly concerned with client voice in their development of the civilian perspective. 
but their incorporation of client penspectives was more indirect than Ibnt proposed by the Critical View. The 
Cahns viewed lawyers as more directive of the disputes that poor clients encounter. nnd they saw litigation 
nnd traditional lawyering as more central to those disputes tIum does the more recent Iiletllture. Set Olhn 
& Cahn, supra note 1. 
13. White, Para@:JC, supra note 9. at 863. 
14. Alfieri. RecolUtTUCrlve Poverty lAw Pracrice. supra note 8. at 2119. 
IS. Several authors have opted to hyphenate the tenn -represent- to stress the word's basic thrust of 
-presenting anew" another person·s story. typically through translation of some sort. Set! Cunningham, A 
Tale of 7Wo CUenrr. Thinking About Law as Language, 87 MIClL 1.. REv. 2459 (1989); L6pez Lay 
Lawyering. supra note 10. at 11-13; Ashe, Bad Mothel'$ and Good IAwyel'$. (unpub1ished mnn=ript on file 
with author) (each discussing -re-presentationj. 
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as clients actually speak less, either in meetings with their lawyersl6 or in 
public proceedings,17 and figurative, as lawyers employ advocacy strategies 
that distort client stories, and replace them with stories that more often reflect 
lawyer perspectives instead.18 As Jerry LOpez writes, "Too often, especially 
when working with the politically and socially subordinated, lawyers presume 
that theirs is the only voice that counts. Clients, particularly those that are 
relatively disempowered, frequently acquiesce in rather than challenge this 
presumption. ,,19 Poverty law practice ought to shift the storytelling from the 
lawyer to the client; the critical measure of success of a practice will be the 
faithfulness of the re-creation of client narrative.lO 
I see also a second theme in the Critical View literature, one which is 
perhaps more subtle, diffuse, and difficult to articulate, but nonetheless plays 
a central part in the construction of a true client-centered, empowerment-based 
practice. This theme is also a more radical one. It questions the role of 
conventional lawyering as an approach to the disputes that subordinated clients 
bring to poverty lawyers? 1 Lawsuits are notoriously poor means by which 
to empower clients. Lawyers, nevertheless, are trained to see lawsuits as a 
preferred, and at times the only, avenue for resolving disputes. The critics 
point out that not only are lawsuits alienating for clients, separated as they are 
from ordinary meaningful client experience and dominated as they are by . 
lawyer thought, but they aIso make very little difference to client circumstances 
in any larger sense. Courts on occasion may offer temporary relief for isolated 
injustices, but the economic and political structures causing the injustices 
remain unaffected. 
Better, argues the Critical View, that lawyers work in a way which Jerry 
LOpez calls "rebellious": 
16. See Sarat, supra note II, at 361. 
17. See Alfieri, Speaking Out o/Tum, supra note 8, at 631; White, Sunday Shoes, supra note 9, at 49. 
18. See Alfieri, ReconstrUctive Poverty Law Pracrice, supra note 8. at 2119. 
19. Liipez, RebelliollS Collaboration, supra note 10, at 1629. 
20. Cunningham, supra note 15-(applying the -lr:Inslntion- idea to Inwyering 8=1Iy, not jI.d 
lawyering for the disenfranchised. 
21. There is a question as well whether clients bring issues to lawyers, with lawyer.; relatively re:lctive, 
or whether lawyers bring issues to poor clients, in a more pro:lctive role. wnu:un Siroon Imp~ more 
support for the latter stance, see Simon, VuiOIU 0/ Practice, supra note II, at 482-86, as doe:! Tony Alfieri, 
see Alfieri, Antinomies, supra note 8, at 665. 1lle ~ctiveJpro:lctive distinction echoes the differing views 
of client individual autonomy discussed below. See notes 60-63 infra and accomp:U1ying text. 
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In this idea-what I call the rebellious idea of lawyering against 
subordination-lawyers must know how to work with, not just on behalf 
of, subordinated people. ... In short, the rebellious idea of lawyering 
demands that lawyers (and those with whom they work) nurture 
sensibilities and skills compatible with a collective fight for social 
change.22 
According to the Critical View, existing practice privileges lawyer views of 
dispute resolution technique, excludes client voices as irrelevant or interfering 
with that technique, and as a result focuses lawyer and client energies on 
litigation-based remedies23 that perpetuate and reinforce client 
powerlessness.24 To claim that these poverty lawyers are benefitting their 
clients in this endeavor is at best misleading, and at worst simply wrong. Tony 
Alfieri, at least, appears to argue that poverty lawyers conduc~ing such a 
practice begin to take on characteristics of oppressors.2' 
B. The Reform of Practice. 
The Critical View does not only critique existing poverty law practice; it 
suggests" the outlmes qf an alternative practice, focused on the goal of 
22. Id. at 1608. see also Anli-Generic ugal Educalion, supra note 10. 
23. 'This critique differs from a corresponding criticism of poverty law pmctice which complalm that 
lawyers for the poor, notably legal services lawyers, take their clients' legal claims less seriously than thcy 
ought to. See Bellow, supra note II, at 56-57 (challenging current practice of = Pr0c:e5Sing client 
disputes in legal services offices, and suggesting more trials, fewer quick settlements); Carlin &. Howard, 
ugal Represenlllrion and Class Jusrice, 12 UCLA 1.. REv. 381,416-17 (noting "perfunctory service"); Sam!, 
supra note II, at 352-55 (legal services clients perceive their lawyers as not pressing claims with grent zeal 
and commitment). My suspicion is that both phenomena, contrary as they may seem, are driven by the same 
"practice ideology" of the legal services setting. See Tremblay, Toward a Communiry-Based Ethic 0/ usal 
Services Pracrice, 37 UCLA 1.. REv. 1101, 1108 (1990); see also discussion infra at notes 71·75 and 
accompanying texL 
24. 'The Critical View sees two related reasons for this perpetuation of powerlessness. First, the client's 
relationship with the lawyer is a dependent one, and thus repzocluces thc hierarchy that otherwise domlmtes 
the client's existence. Second, the use of a lawsuit (or even a shadow lawsuit device, such as negollntlon 
or administrative proceedings) exercises status quo power relations, accepts that status quo, and in doing so 
siphons off energies that might have greater long term benefit focused on organizing for political and 
economic power. 
25. -[l']he habits of perception and interpretation dominant in the practice of poverty law ••• reify and 
reproduce myths of legal efficacy, and inherent indigent isolation and passivity which sustain and reinforce 
relations of power oppressive to the poor.- Alfieri, linrinomies, supra note 8, at 661. See also White, 
Paratiax, supra note 9, at 861 (conventional lawyering reproduces subordination). 
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empowerment. Critical View practice will incorporate client voice 
ncontinually,n to employ Lucie White's term.16 One important method of 
that incorporation is to ensure that the client's narrative is re-presented in the 
lawyerly work product emerging from the attomey-client relationship. The 
legal storytelling that occurs in pleadings, argument, negotiation, publicity, and 
so forth ought to be the client's story, not the lawyer's reconceptualization of 
that story."rT Rather than ntailoringn the narrative the lawyer hears to fit 
preexisting legal categories-a process which leaves clients mute-poverty 
lawyers oUght to engage in dialogue with clients to ensure as faithful a 
translation of client story as possible. 
Inclusion of client voice also implies more meaningful methods of 
collaborating with clients on lawyering activity. Even politically sensitive and 
client-centered28 lawyers tend to work in isolation in developing work product, 
even if their intent is to craft that product to accomplish goals determined and 
directed by the clients. The Critical View argues against this separation of 
function, and against this isolation. Tony Alfieri offers an example of what 
this might mean. He is quite self-critical in his description of his earlier client 
representation in a class action lawsuit challenging food stamp regulations for 
his failure to include his client in the legal strategies underlying the litigation: 
I did not fully include her in discussions regarding the constitutional and 
statutory bases of her case or the strategy of litigation designed to attack 
the food stamp regulations. Nor did I provide her with legal materials 
(e.g., statutes, regulations, legislative history, case law) to explicate my 
case theory and strategy.29 
26. White, Paradox. supra note 13. 
27. "The intent is ••• to understand and rectify the loss of client =tives in lawyer stol)1e1ling.-
Alfieri. Reconstructive Poverty Law, supra note 8. at 2119. Su also Speaking 0-.11 01 Tum, supra note 8. 
at 620-633; While, SwuJay Shoes, supra note 9. at 49; Cnhn, Defining Femlnln Ulfgarfon, 14 HARv. 
WOMrN·s U. I, IS-18 (1991); Cunningham, supra note IS. 
28. Client-centeredness is the rather accepted phrnse for a view of the lawyer[client relationship th:lt 
argues for decisiorunaking pro<:esses encouraging development of client yalues and client-ch= rem.:dies. 
It derives form the David Binder and Susan Price text on legal interviewing and counseling. D. Blntkr & 
S. Price, Lega11nzerviewing and CoulISeUng (1978). See also. Dinerstein, Clienr-Cenured CouIISeUng: 
Reappraisal and Refinement, 32 Ariz. L. Rev. SOl (1990). 
29. Alfieri, Reconstructive PO~'erty Law Pracrfce, supra note 8, at 2128. Jerry LOpez offers a similaz 
example in his fictional aeoount of Marth:l and 1esse. Mnrtlu, the lawyer, develop!! a terrific plan (or 
beginning to explore multidimensional lllctics in responze to 1=·5 ap~t racial discrimin:ltion, ;md 
~ while lauding the plan, criticizes 1esse·s abzenee from th:lt process. LOpez. RelMllJous Collaoorarfon. 
Supra note 10. at 1657. 
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These suggestions serve both process and substance goals.30 More 
meaningful, actual participation in the lawyering process empowers clients, in 
ways which having their case handled by an attorney will not. In addition, 
however, this participation may also have the benefit of increasing the 
likelihood of achieving the goal of the representation, of "winning."li Jerry 
LOpez describes his fictional lawyer discussing her responsibilities to her clients 
in a civil rights dispute as follows: 
With respect to Jesse [the client], I imagine this would involve 
maximizing his role in decisionmaking and seeking to portray, represent 
and characterize in the lawsuit his and Sylvia's [his wife] life experience, 
not only because this effort might be more politically satisfying but 
because it's likely to generate afar more effective legal prodllct.32 
I also read this same message in Lucie White's Sunday Shoes story and her 
reflections upon it.'3 White tells a powerful story of the struggle between a 
legal services lawyer and her client to fashion the most appropriate presentation 
of the client's welfare hearing. The client rebels at the hearing and tells her 
story, in her own voice, in a way not anticipated by the lawyer in her 
collaboration with the client, ~d ultimately prevails. White does not pretend 
to offer us a neat "moral" for her story, as the characters and their histories are 
complex and in flux, but it appears important to her telling of the story that the 
client ultimately "won" the matter for which she sought the aid of the 
lawyer.34 
30. For a discussion of the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic values in the aHomey-clienl 
relalionship, see Cunningham, supra nole IS; Cahn, supra nole 27, al 16-19. 
31. ~Winning~ in this conlext instrumental goals-e.g., influencing a decisioMlDker, negotiating a 
satisfactory resolution to a dispute, etc. I use the term in contrast with process goals, which are intrinsic, 
and which may be independent of substantive instrumental goals. Every representation has both elements. 
I read the Critical View to argue (or perhaps to assume) that client collaboration nssists the accomplishment 
of both. 
32. LOpez, Rebe/lJous Collaboration., supra note 10, at 1710 (emphasis added). 
33. White, Sunday Shou, supra note 9. 
34. See id. at 47. The lawyer had tried to ~collaborate- with Mrs. O. in devising IU1 advocacy plan. Yet 
the tenns of that -dialogue- excluded Mrs. O.·s voice. Mrs. O. was a bener strategist thnn the lawYeJ-1l1ore 
daring, more subtle, more fluent-in her home terrain. Tony Alfieri, similarly, tells the story of l~phine 
V., his client who -speaks out of tum- at her public assistance hearing, boldly nnd unconventionally so, 
giving life to the voice that the lawyering had so suppressed. Alfieri, Spea1cJng Out of Turn, supra note 8, 
at 643. She, like Mrs. 0 .. also won the hearing at which she spoke out. rd., at n.128. 
Martha F"meman writes of the ~morals- that audiences draw from the stories they hear. Finemnn, 
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Implementing what I have called the client voice theme in Critical View 
practice would mean involving clients in lawyering activities in a fashion 
which, it is fair to assume, greatly exceeds that of conventional lawyer/client 
collaboration presently. In doing so, the Critical View asserts that the clients' 
success on the matteIS for which they have consulted the lawyer will be 
enhanced. 
The Critical View's transformed vision of practice also stresses the 
importance of community organization and collective activity. It undetstands 
clients not as isolated v.ictims, but as actoIS in a broader social fabric. It argues 
for a professional duty of poverty lawyeIS to strive to form connections among 
clients and among other disadvantaged people. This duty, which Tony Alfieri 
calls the "ethic of resistance,"3S is central to the Critical View's thesis.36 
Alfieri writes that "recognizing collective networks of resistance is 
indispensable to recapturing the omitted stories of clients. u37 Jerry LOpez's 
account of rebelIious lawyering insightfully questions the effectiveness of 
litigation to deal with the community tensions which his civil rights story 
represents, while acknowledging at the same time the leverage the courts do 
(sometimes) offer to the disempowered. The lawyer in his account offers this 
possibility of a strategy that might prevail for her clients: 
[M]y present conception of the ideal ultimate solution to the problem is 
a collective, nonadjudicated discussion and negotiated end to police 
harassment and forced exclusion of Latinos from Zalaipa. In order to 
move toward such a solution, we are going to need time to help mobilize 
the Latino community and to convince the Anglo leadeIS to listen and 
bargain.38 
Dominant Discourse, Prolessional Language, and ugaf Ckange in Child Custody DecUfonmaklng, 101 
HARv. 1.. REv. 727 (1988). While implicit, the meaning we derive from the stories of Jesse, Mrs. 0 .. and 
Josephine V. is that success in lawyered disputes is more likely if lawyer.; can 1= to -cede- the voice 10 
their clients. 
35. Alfieri, Speaking Our 01 Tum, supra note 8,I1t 622. 
36. It is fair to say that eaeb of the I1Uthors cited in notes 8·12 supra, has relied on collective efforts 
as essential 10 a truly mdical poverty law practice. 
37. Alfieri, Speaking Our 01 Tum, supra note 8,I1t 646. Alfieri's enrlier """riling contains an even more 
vocal call f~ development of communities of clients to empower them to confront the oppr=ion ""'bleb they 
have fuced individWlJly and in isolation. See Antinomies, supra note 8, at 7G4-710. 
. 38. LOpez, Rebellious CQliaborarlon. supra note 10, at 1668. 
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Lucie White is also explicit in suggesting a rethinking of conventional 
litigation strategies on behalf of the poor: 
What, indeed, can advocates do? Rather than seeking any more remedies 
for the poor, we might hesitate for a moment before filing another lawsuit, 
even if we know exactly how to frame a winning claim. Instead, we 
might look around us for spaces where poor people can talk among 
themselves about what they want to do.39 
The sentiments of the Critical View on the benefits of assisting the poor to 
organize for collective action are not new, of course.40 They deserve our 
close attention, however, even if they echo themes expressed before. The more 
recent efforts to advocate a collective orientation to poverty law emerge from 
a more sophisticated base, relying as they do on critical left philosophers, 
critical race theory, and feminist notions of contextual and connected visions. 
These efforts are therefore powerful, both in evocative and intellectual force. 
The efforts appear to comprise a more coherent paradigm of radical practice, 
and to offer suggestions which transcend the prior distinctions between 
individual casework, impact litigation, and community bonding efforts. That 
coherence adds to the force of the Critical View, and at the Same time 
necessitates increased, if still appreciative, scrutitiy. 
ll. THE CRITICAL VIEW ASSESSED: A TRAGIC PERSPECTIVE 
The vision of practice I have just described has great attraction. It captures 
and builds upon values I share, and that most poverty lawyers ought to, and 
likely will, embrace. It is descriptively correct. Lawyering for the poor as 
39. White, Paradox. supra note 9, at 887. Stt also White, MobilUArion on the Marsiru, supra notc 9, 
at S46 (conceding that the ends of that collective conversation would not be to effect judicial change, but 
to accomplish the -broader gonlO- of -a momentary experience in the exercise of power"). Howard LesnIck 
offers a similar view of lawyering which he terms -radical,- as contrasted with -liberal- or -conservative,-
which would -conununalize the representation of a client ••• in the more fundamental sense of enabling (the 
client] to see that the problem presented to him by (the clienfs adversary] is one that he has in common with 
others, and that one route to his empowerment is for him to seek solutions as part of a community.-
Lesnick, supra note 11, at 438. 
40. Jean and Edgar Cahn were concerned with collective efforts in their early writing about poverty law 
practice. See War on Poverty, supra note I, at 135 I. Set also Wexler, PracticinS lAw lor Poor Peopk. 
79 YAU! U. 1049. IOS3 (1970); Comment.1he New Public Interest lAwyers. 79 YAU! U. 1069 (1970). 
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presently constituted is disempowering for poor clients. It is normatively 
attractive as well. A practice that serves to begin to empower clients (or even 
to disempower less), and that might effect the beginning changes in the 
political landscape for disadvantaged persons warrants serious attention. 
Poverty lawyers need to engage consistently in self-reflection about how their 
practice impacts on their client community, including ways in which their work 
and their ideologies impact on clients in ways that may be ignored or 
overlooked. The Critical View represents that reflective stance at its best. 
While I am seduced by the Critical View, at the same time I fmd myself 
questioning several of its suggestions, and this section of this Article will begin 
to sketch out my concerns. My limited purpose here is to pose questions about 
how the Critical View vision can work. A Theory of Practice perspective must 
be vigilant on that score. The questions will revolve around two notions-the 
role of autonomy in the new vision of practice, and the reconciliation of the 
triage function with the teaching of the Critical View. 
These two concerns seem to reflect my bias that the Critical View ought to 
acknowledge more satisfactorily the context of legal services practice: the high 
volume, perpetual crisis, "emergency room" milieu of the neighborhood 
office. 41 This bias contains within it at least two assumptions. It assumes 
that a Theory 9f Practice for poverty law ought to account for legal services 
practice. While.the Critical View clearly appli.es to lawyering for subordinated 
clients outside the legal services setting,42 by far most lawyering for the poor 
will occur within the subsidized legal aid milieu. My bias also assumes that 
the legal services offices where the poverty law takes place will in fact 
resemble "emergency room" settings, and because of that will be bou,nd, in 
some fashion, by triage principles. This second assumption seems to me less 
self-evident. 'The Critical View could argue for a design of legal services 
practice that does not become bound by triage considerations. As I discuss 
41. I suppose I am now confmning the prophesy of Tony Alfieri, who IRTOte, -rile joining or lh:or.t 
and prectice [which he was espousing} may disench:mt some in the poverty law community. ~y may rairly 
object that theory is too remote from the upheaval of daily pmdice 10 be of use.. Alfieri, &C01Ulruct{ .. ·~ 
Poverty lAw, supra note 8, at 2120. Alfieri's predidion is clo::.e 10 the mark. I do not rmd the lh:or.t to 
be of no use, but I do believe that its negled of the ·upheaval- is a failing. 
42. See, e.g., LOpez, Rebellious Collaboration, supra nole 10, (private ~ litigating civil rights 
matter). Jerry LOpez points out that much of the civil rights work that 0CCUlS =les from prlVllte law 
offices, see ill. nt 1611, but that should not imply that most lawyering Ildivity rot' poor per"...ons is h:!ndled 
by non-public SOllI'Ca 
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below,·3 I find this possibility unlikely, and therefore I take my two 
assumptions to be reasonable ones. 
Let me fIrst explore the autonomy issues I see as critical here, and the fIrst 
of those attaches to the Hclient voice'" theme. The argument that client voice 
be taken more seriously has several consequences, some of which appear to be 
without any foreseeable drawbacks. For instance, it is hard to disagree with the 
proposition that lawyers ought to be faithful to the stories clients bring to the 
interaction, be empathic to the needs, feelings, and values of the clients, and 
not substitute lawyer goals for client goals." This lesson, which is contained 
within the Critical View, merely reflects current ethical teaching.·s I see the 
Critical View as far more than a sophisticated version of Binder & Price, 
however. The Rclient voice" theme I have described calls for a level of 
collaboration and a view of the attomey-client relationship that does raise 
intriguing consequences. 
The collaborative suggestions seem to impact on the intrinsic goals in the 
representation (the storytelling function-ensuring that clients are heard), as well 
as the instrumental goals in the representation (accomplishing the results sought 
when the client consulted a lawyer). As Naomi Cahn notes, it may be as 
signifIcant for a client to have her story heard in a meaningful way as it is to 
win her case on the merits.46 Clark Cunningham's stories remind us of the 
same thing.·7 What must be addressed, however, is the tradeoff that may 
result in any given lawyer/client encounter between intrinsic and instrumental 
ends. The Critical View largely elides this question. 
The Critical View literature implies that intrinsic and extrinsic goals are not 
in conflict and may even dovetail. For instance, Lucie White and Tony AlfIeri 
tell stories of clients who expose their own voices, contrary to the strategy 
judgment of their respective lawyers. In doing so, each client is empowered 
43. Su note 71, infra and accompanying text. 
44. As Carl Hosticka, among others, has shown, lawyers, and p:uticularly legal services lawyem, often 
do not meet this ethical standard of practice in fact. Hosticka, We Don't Care About What Happened, We 
Only Car About What is Going to Happen: Lawyer-Clienr Negotiations of RealIty, 26 Soc. PROBLEMS 599 
(1979). 
45. Su, e.g., D. BINDER, P. BERClMAN & S. PRICE, LAWUERS AS COUNSELORS (1990); D. BINDER & 
S. PRICE, supra note 28. 
46. Cahn, supra note 27, at 17. 
47. Cunningham, supra note IS, at 2492. 
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by the process and prevails on the merits.48 But the question remains: What 
if, in those stories, the client had lost? What if the lawyer's judgment, limited 
in scope and vision as it was, and focused as it was on regulatory arguments 
and advocacy technique, had been correct in its predictions about the conduct 
of the decisionmaker? 
There is some reason to suppose that powerless people may benefit, in (short 
term) instrumental terms, from having their stories translated by lawyers into 
"logic of the law.'" The Critical View authors themselves teach us why this 
risk is ever present Lucie White's rich discussion in two of her articles49 of 
the political implications of language educates us that "patterns of talk which 
socially powerless people typically use in informal courts may not 'articulate' 
well with the logic of the law. usa Similarly, Jerry LOpez's article on lay 
lawyering demonstrates that effective advocacy will imploy "stock stories'" 
which take into account the decisionmaker's view of the world." 
That there are serious costs in intrinsic terms (as well as in long term 
instrumental terms) in the translation of client stories by lawyers is an insight 
we often overlook, and the Critical View is impressive in reminding us of that 
consequence. Once having recognized those costs, however, an autonomy 
perspective would argue that the matter must be addressed in terms of informed 
consent In other words, if ·there is a chance of instrumental "gains at the . 
expense of intrinsic, one would expect that-everything else being equal (which 
48. White, Sunday Shoes, supra note 9; Alfieri, SpeakIng Our o/Tum, supra note 8. Su no!e$ 30-34 
and accompanying text. Mrs. O. in Lucie White's ruurntive opts, to the surprize of her lawyer,lo justify her 
spending of a lump sum recovery on items such lIS ·Sunday shoes· for her children. White indiQ!e$ th.:!t 
such an expense did 001 qualify lIS appropriate under the :!pplicnble rcgubtions, and the c1ient's sul]7rize 
testimony did 001 comport with the leg:!1 theol)' developed by the lawyer (with actively if perll:lp:; 
unsuccessfully invited input from the client). Josephine v. in Tony A1fieri's stol)' speaks ·oul of tum· at 
her welfare hearing, and offers an imp:=ioned account of her strength amid oppressive poverty. Her 
speaking out is described by Alfieri !lS against the judgment of her Inwyer, wh= legnJ ~l)' unwittingly 
suppressed her ruurntive. As noted, both Mrs. O. and Josephine V. won their welfnrc he:uin8S-
49. White, MobiJlzJJrion on the Margins, supra note 9, at 543 n.35i Sunday Shoes, supra note 9, at 14-
19. 
SO. White, MobillzDlion on the Margins, supra note 9, lit 543 n.35, eldng O'BARR &. co.-.u;y, Rt11LS 
VERsus RELATIONSHIPS IN SMALL Cl.AIMs DISPUTES, IN CONmCT TAU<: (A. Grimshaw ed.) (1989). 
51. LOpez. Lay Lawyering, supra note 10, at 9, 29, 45. 
Intelligibility demands that Son tell a stol)' that Man can = and h= as one of his ov.n::tock storie:L 
To do that nKlSt effectively, Son must understand wbnt it means to tell II story that Man would be 
willing to lldopt !lS his own version of his relationship 10 Mom in the ~
Id., at 29. 
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it may not be in a legal services context, if one adopts a triage ethic'2)-a 
client will decide which is preferred. 
The Critical View does not reject client-centeredness on this score. It tends 
not to capture the choice at all, in that it sees client collaboration as 
instrumentally effective as well as intrinsically effective.'3 Again, it is 
important to distinguish the Critical View's collaboration lesson from more 
traditional notions of client-centeredness. The latter model has been justified 
as producing "better results," since the client is the only true judge of what is 
most important to him.$4 Client-centeredness permits clients to make 
"unwise" decisions once fully informed about consequences. The Critical 
View's collaboration method also sanctions such client-directed 
decisionmaking, and in doing so is consonant with the existing ethical model. 
But the Mrs. G. and Josephine V. stories are qualitatively different in their 
teaching, if I read them correctly. They redefine the lawyer's role in the 
counseling process. Rather than ask the client to choose among options as 
defined by the lawyer's legal analysis, these stories rely more directly on the 
client's assessment of strategy, aiming both to achieve empowerment goals and 
instrumental, success-related goals at once. My sense, and my reasons for 
~anting to think more carefully about the Critical View lesson, is that in many 
cases that reliance may be subject to some more or less substantial risks to the 
merits of the case, in ·which case those risks must then be processed according 
to informed consent standards. 
Saying that informed consent needs to be factored into the discussion merely 
introduces two additional complex considerations. The first is that many 
clients who come to a legal services office, if faced with the c~oice, will opt 
S2. TIle triage obligations of a legal services office might create very difficult choices on this !:COre. 
See discussion belOw, infra at notes 70-71 and accompanying text. 
53. Lueie White does consider in her discussion of the three -ideal types- of activist lawyers the 
possibility that, in impact litigation contexts, a -lawyer and client may choose to ••. sacrifice a favorable 
outcome precisely in order to make the litigation spelIk most effectively to public consclousness .. - WhIte, 
To Learn and Teach, supra note 7, 3t759. Her discussion there, however, assumes a joint goal of political 
change, and she does not address the process by which a client is confronted with the initial question of 
defining the ends of the representation. 
54. The -better results- argument was filSt posed by Mark Spiegel. Spiegel, LAwyering and CUent 
Declsionmaldng: Informed COTlSent and lhe Legal Profession, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 41. 85 (1979). See also 
DINERSlEN, supra note 28, at 544-46. 
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for instrumental ends over intrinsic ends when they are in conflict." Because 
clients come to legal services lawyers when they are in crisis (with income, 
housing, health, or safety in rather immediate jeopardy), we are not surprised 
by this choice. The second is that those clients who do opt for intrinsic ends 
at the expense of instrumental ends will force poverty lawyers to confront very 
difficult triage questions. -These triage considerations will be developed 
below.56 
If client-centeredness and autonomy concerns inform (and complicate) the 
storytelling notion, they also achieve significance in the Critical View's 
proposals about creative, empowering lawyering methods. Consider the 
following lesson from Tony Alfieri: 
My thesis is that poverty cannot-indeed should not-be remedied by these 
[conventional lawyering] traditions. Remedial litigation should not be 
mounted, even where altruistic relief is possible, without the activization 
of class consciousness among the poor, nor without the political 
organization and mobilization of the poor." 
Alfieri's plea is persuasive, given his premises (poverty lawyer's mandate is 
to empower the poor; empowerment only can be achieved by collective. 
efforts). Other Critical View writers have expressed similar sentiments.'s 
What seems missing from this plea, however, is the client's participation and 
engagement in the choice of goals.'9 
The methods I shall term "collective" promise substantial long term benefit 
but at some recognizable cost-the foregoing of short term gain. To argue that 
5S. For instance, if -speaking out- at a welfare hearing is likely to deaw:.e the c:hanees or obtaining 
a successful ruling from the ndrninistrative Inw judge, then the client must decide whether the ~dp:!to%y 
balefils of speaking out will outweigh the risk thnt doing zo will lelld to a lo::s of the welfare beJclils ct 
issue in the proceeding. 
56. See notes 70-71 infra and ~eeompnnying text. 
57. Alfieri, Antinomies, supra note 8, at 664. 
58. White, Paradox., supra note 9, at 885; LOpez, &b-tllious Collaboralion, supra note 10, ct 1669, 
1709. 
59. In this regard this criticism ree:ills Stephen EIImnnn's ol=rlation thct the Binder & Price eo=ling 
and interviewing models were patemali.stic in their instruction to Inwyer.l to impo:;e a model of eonv=tion 
(client-cente:redness) upon clients without the Inller's input into thnl choice. EIlmnnn, lAW'j~rs and C1I~nu, 
34 UCLA L. REv. 717 (1987). 
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lawyers possess a professional duty60 to adopt collective remedies is to assume 
some consent on the part of clients to engage in those remedies, or to assume 
some basis for foregoing that consent. A traditional autonomy perspective 
would suggest a process of dialogue leading to client-centered decisions on 
how to proceed.61 The emphasis in Critical View literature on faithfulness to 
client voice implies acceptance of this view of autonomy. There is another 
view of autonomy, captured best perhaps by the writing of William 
Simon,62which argues in favor of less reliance on client description and 
reporting of values, interests, and judgments, and instead cedes to the lawyer 
greater responsibility for effecting (and affecting) the development of client 
self-determination.63 I sense disagreement of the Critical View with the 
Simon perspective, but I may be wrong in that assessment, and the Critical 
View writers may not agree among themselves on how to approach that issue. 
What does seem evident is that this autonomy configuration as it applies to the 
Critical View practice suggestions needs much greater exploration. 
Having said this, I will note that the conventional autonomy principle 
appears to interfere somewhat with the Critical View's collective emphasis. 
The Critical View must recognize the possibility that poor clients, facing a 
choice between the long term, speculative rewards of collective, organizing 
efforts and the short term, less speculative (if perhaps more illusory) benefits 
of individual dispute resolution technique, often will opt for the latter, based 
on the urgency of their circumstances. A Theory of Practice that compe/s64 
collective efforts must confront the client role in the adoption of that ethic. If, 
on the other hand, one argues that lawyers must encourage clients to become 
empowered, and to engage collectively, and not rely on client initiative on that 
60. The literature often employs language of duty in its discussion of collective. empowering lawyering 
methods. See, e.g., Alfieri, Antinomies, supra nole 8, at 664 (remedial litigation -should not be mounted-
without empowennent measures). Lucie White and Jerry LOpez describe the duty more In proc:e:;s terms, 
arguing that lawyers for the poor have an obligation to understand and to consider collective remedies. See 
White. Paradox, supra note 9, at 887; LOpez, Rebellious Collaboration, supra note 10, at 1608. 
61. See, e.g., BINDER, BEROMAN &. PRICE, LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS 16-23 (1991); Dlnersteln, supra 
note 28, at 512-16. . 
62. See Simon, VISions of Practice, supra nole II, at 488 (lawyer's role Is to enhance client's ability 
to express interests, and -to consider that people have interests of which they are not aware"); Simon, £lhlcal 
Discretion in lAwyering, 101 HARv. 1.. REv. 1083, illS (autonomy is not self·evident trump of other 
values); Simon, lAwyer Advice and CUent Autonomy: Mrs. Jones's Case, 50 MD. 1.. REv. 213 (1991). 
63. For a critique of the Simon view, see Dinerslein, supra note 28, at 556-66. 
64. See Alfieri, Antinomies, supra note 8, at 664. 
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front, one must then reconcile that activism with the notably anti-activist tone 
of the Critical View in its reliance on client voice. 
The other response to the autonomy question is an institutional one. A legal 
services program might opt to focus its efforts only on those clients who agree 
to participate in collective refonn efforts. Having done so, the institution will 
have defIned away this infonned consent question, as is its presumptive 
institutional right. 6S Whether an office possesses ethical justification for doing 
so, or whether the program might also choose to deprive clients of an infonned 
consent choice regarding individual, intrinsic remedies, requires some thought 
about triage. The triage implications of the Critical View's teachings are 
significant. 66 
There are two ways in which the Critical View's ideas impact on the triage 
function. The first observation is that the Critical View's long view, its 
empowennent view approaching a professional obligation, will face very 
tangible obstacles at the street level. The more that a legal services office 
assumes the role of the community's legal emergency room, the more difficult 
it will be to stress, as the Critical View does, a focus on long tenn remedies. 
In a perfect world the poor would have the legal equivalent of both emergency 
rooms and public health planning resources. In our imperfect world the poor 
have but ope institution, the legal services office. It is unlikely, given its" 
assignment as savior of last resort, that the institution will be capable of 
adopting the long view, particularly that suggested by the Critical View. A 
long view that still seeks institutional change within the system (Lucie White's 
"first-dimensional" (or even "second-dimensionaln ) lawyering61) offers some 
concrete expectation to clients in need; a long view that seeks more substantive, 
structural change outside the existing system (White's "third-dimensional 
lawyering") might be more difficult for programs to justify ethically if clients 
are suffering presently.68 
65. Several writers have explicated the justifications for ::m institutionalleg31 !;elVices progr:un to fcxus 
on long tenn change for the benefit of m::my, at the expense of short term, individual efforts. Su &110111 
& Kettleson, From Elhies 10 Poliries: Confronring Scarcity and Fa/mas III Public Inur~Sf Pracnc~. 58 
B.UL. REv. 337 (1978); LUBAN, LAWYERS AND Iusncr: ~ EnnCAL SroDY 306-310 (1988). 
66. I have addressed the triage implications of legal ~ices practice elsewhere. Trembllly, supra Il<Ite 
23. The discussion that follows in the text builds on the ideas I expressed there. 
67. White, To Learn and Teach, supra note 7, at 755·57. 
68. 1be difference in attrnctiveness seems grounded in the degree of sp~culanon inherent in each route. 
Collective efforts will continue to feel more specullltive tlun, say, a class action b .... "SlIiL nus is panly 
because the IlIwyers are the decisionma1cers, see Tremblay, supra note 23, at 1138-39, but p:utly bee3= we 
have less experiences upon which to draw to make fum predictions in the collective rea1m. Only if tJu: 
Critical View persuades us that intra-system efforts make no r~al dJJ!er~nce will this irwtuality in speeubtion 
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Institutionally, much pressure will exist to confront the immediacy of the 
crises of clients' lives. The emergency room model of legal services practice 
will justify an ethical triage process that prioritizes immediate need, and 
deprioritizes the long term benefit of empowerment. The Critical View 
challenges this choice of priorities, but wanes in influence on this question by 
the inherent speculativeness of the benefits which it offers. That is not to say 
that it is wrong in its prediction; rather the Critical view poses an argument that 
is difficult to sustain among the actual decisionmakers in the face of immediate 
pain among clients asking for assistance.69 
What I have just outlined is a descriptive, psychological view of the poverty 
law context. It is not necessarily a normative view. The normative question 
is whether a triage process favoring the short term and immediate over the long 
term and less immediate is an ethically justifiable one. That question must be 
left for another day.70 My point here is that the Critical View tends not to 
incorporate in its critique the context that demands such a triage. I do not read 
the Critical View as defining triage out of the picture. One might seek to 
implement the Critical View's practice models in a way that minimized triage, 
but that structure would then violate, it seems, many of the important values 
expressed by the Critical View. Triage seems avoidable only by structural, 
limitations on 'representation, which limitations would descend from above, 
from the institutional hierarchy. The inclusion of client narrative, client life 
experience, and client voice plainly implies much individual contact, and 
individual contact plainly implies triage.71 
evaporate. While some may argue that extra-systemic methods are in fact as ordered and predictable as intra-
systemic methods, see Simon, VISions of Practic~, supra note II, at 496 n.68, it will call for substantial 
education to overcome the feeling that intra-system work is less speCUlative. 
69. See Lesnick, supra note II, at 449 (the failings of a radical perspective are that the very integrity 
of its critique disables it from addressing -the here-and-now of particular issues, which invariably arise out 
of a context that from a radical perspective is pervasively flawed-). 
70. I intend to continue to explore that question in a forthcoming Essay in the Hastings Law Journal's 
Symposium on the 1beoretics of Practice. S~~ Tremblay, &~lIious Lawyering. &gnant Lawyering. and 
Srreer Lev~l Bureaucracy. 43 HAsr.L.1.(l992) (forthcoming). 
71. nus issue needs to be developed at greater length, but it appears that triage will be inevitable in a 
legal services context unless one radically redesigned a neighborhood office (or, perhaps, eliminated the idea 
of neighborhood offices) to control representation decisions based upon factors orher than triage. Those 
factors will inevitably be reflective of larger community needs (certain kinds of welfare or housing dispute:). 
e.g.), and the more that the institutional mission is driven by that kind of objective, the greater the 
interference in the value of client voice and individual client collaboration. For further discussion of the 
conflict between the role of individual clients and of larger community goals, see Tremblay, supra note 23, 
at 1124-29. 
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The second triage point is one that is far more tentative and disconcerting, 
but one deserving some thought. For it I return to Tony Alfieri's recounting 
of his experience with his food stamp litigation.n His self-criticism, really 
criticism directed to poverty lawyers generally, challenged lawyering that 
excluded the poor from active participation in the details of their legal work. 
He asserts that clients will be empowered by that participation, and, since client 
empowerment is the goal of poverty law practice, such active collaboration is 
essential. 
But how does that assertion confront the reality of triage? If there is a 
distinction between instrumental and intrinsic needs of clients, and if we 
assume a single office available to all the poor in the community, it might be 
argued that it is not unfair for the institution to justify a preference for 
instrumental goals over intrinsic goals. This supposition deserves much more 
thought, for it has a visceral unpleasantness. But, in thinking of Alfieri's 
example, do we fault a legal services office for litigating a food stamp action 
without teaching clients about the role of regulations and statutes, if that 
decision is based on the principle of serving more people? Such collaboration 
has important benefits, but it is accomplished directly at the price of excluding 
other clients entirely. 
In the article in ·which Alfieri insists on the collaborative lawyering just 
described, he relates that on the day that his food stamp client came to the 
office for assistance, 30 or 40 prospective clients were screened at the door. 
Of those, 10 or 12 ultimately were found "worthy" of consideration for 
representation.73 It seems to be a fair inquiry, and an important ethical 
inquiry, to wonder whether the lawyers who choose to educate clients less 
about the complexities of their case in order to have time to offer some 
representation to other excluded clients are not modeling a more effective 
poverty law practice. 
One possible, and one might say likely, consequence of the triage 
perspective as applied to the food stamp client is that the process will privilege 
instrumental concerns over intrinsic concerns where the choice between the two 
seems stark. An example will make this point clear. Clark Cunningham has 
described "The Case of the Silenced Lawyer,,,74 a prisoner whom 
Cunningham's office represented by appointment of the federal court. The 
72. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Pracrlce, supra note 8. See note 29, supra and aeccrnp:lOying 
text. 
73. Alfieri Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice,supra note 8, a12122 (Ihe.= quoles are Alfieri's). 
74. Cunningham, supra nole IS, al 2465-69. 
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matter when referred by the court was framed as a civil rights case, and the 
clinical students saw immediate due process arguments, around which they 
developed their brief. The client's "story," however, was very different-so 
different that he discharged the counsel because their "translation" of his theory 
into more conventional doctrine violated his integrity." 
Cunningham's narrative, while teaching several important insights, offers an 
example of a difference between client Hvoice" and lawyer "voice." The client 
seemingly had a chance to "win" with the lawyers' arguments, but "winning" 
was not what was important to him, at least not if he was deprived of his story 
in the process. In this way the narrative exemplifies a central theme of the 
Critical View-the ways in which lawyers misunderstand and distort client lives. 
At the same time his narrative also shows us the tragedy of triage, for in a 
legal services setting his need to have his ("losing") story expressed would be 
given, I suspect, very low priority. Client-centeredness would suggest that he 
craft his case as he, and not his lawyer, sees tit, but triage would interfere to 
say that he could not have access to a lawyer to assist him to do so. 
CONCLUSION 
Any real conclusion would seem out of place for this article, for it offers 
only questions and inquiries that deserve further exploration. My purpose has 
been to embrace the Critical View for its persistent defense of subordinated 
clients in an arena where their voices are too often suppressed. At the same 
time I have sought to question how the ideals of the Critical View might be 
reconciled, even if they indeed will be compromised, with the street-level 
bureaucracy of most poverty law practices. Perhaps I am too pessimistic; my 
inability to accept easily the improved vision of practice might reflect my 
entrenchment in the present system.76 In any event, the questions I pose are 
real to me and a truly meaningful theory of practice will seek to address 
questions of empowerment in a regime characterized by great scarcity and great 
misery. 
75. 11le client's theory was that t~ entire disciplinary system at the prison was unconstitutional. 
Cunningham implies that this argument was not one thatt~ students were comfortable arguing. lei. al 2466· 
67. 
76. Set Lesnick, supra note II, at 439-454. 
